On February 28, 2026, the United States and Israel launched missile attacks on Iran, coined “Operation Epic Fury” by the Trump administration, igniting a new war in the Middle East that could quickly flare into a region wide conflict. Speaking at a Congressional Medal of Honor ceremony, President Donald Trump outlined some of his objectives in the war. They include (1), destroying Iran’s missile capabilities, (2) the annihilation of the Iranian navy, (3) ensuring that Iran can never obtain a nuclear weapon, and (4) ensuring that Iran can no longer arm, fund and direct terrorist organizations outside of their borders ¹. These criteria will likely remain fluid, however, depending on how the war unfolds. As of March 2, the US and Israel have together struck at least 2,000 targets inside Iran, with the death toll amounting to at least 555 civilians, ²  including a number of officials in Iran’s senior leadership, the most notable one being, the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who after ruling Iran for thirty-seven years, was killed in his compound in Tehran, the nation’s capital ³. Commenting on how long the war will last, Trump himself has been ambiguous, and Secretary of War, Pete Hegseth, said it may take “four weeks, two weeks, six weeks. It could move up. It could move back.” 

Iran, meanwhile, responded with retaliatory strikes targeting Israel and other Arab countries that host US forces, including Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Jordan ⁴. Iran also struck Oman, who was helping facilitate negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program with the US in Geneva. These attacks have encouraged discussions among the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to end their neutrality in the war ⁵. European leaders, on the other hand, have had mixed reactions. However, in a joint statement, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom condemned Iran’s retaliatory strikes ⁶, and the UK has since allowed the US to use its bases to strike Iranian missile sites ⁷ after Iran targeted their military base in Cyprus ⁸. As the war threatens to rope the US’s Gulf and European allies, Iran’s new, temporary, leadership council has vowed to avenge Khamenei’s killing, with the country’s foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi revealing a new Supreme Leader would be chosen in “one or two days” ⁹. They have called the joint US-Israeli operations unprovoked and a violation of international law, citing their sovereign right to defend itself, saying that “we see no limit for ourselves to defend, our people to protect our people ¹⁰.

The ongoing hostilities between the US and Iran is a new and dangerous low point in the bilateral relations of the two nations. While it may seem today that the US and Iran have always been intransigent foes, history reveals that not to be the case. In fact, at its inception, in 1850, US-Iranian relations started off on a positive note when the US authorized negotiations for a treaty of friendship and commerce with the Kingdom of Persia ¹¹. Given this, it’s important to ask how US-Iranian relations arrived at the point that they are at today? Why, since the Iranian Hostage crisis, do the two sides remain hostile adversaries and whether there is there any possibility that their relationship could be mended. 

Exploring these questions is the goal of this two-part series I am writing on the history of US-Iranian relations from roughly the early 20th century up to the current day. In these articles, I will shed light on Iran’s history, showing how its past historical episodes can, in part, reveal why its relations with the United States are strained. In this article, I will write about the impact of British and Russian influence in Iran during World Wars I and II, the 1953 coup of Mohammed Mossadegh, the rule of Reza Shah Pahlavi, “the Shah”, from 1953-1979, and the 1979 Islamic Revolution, resulting in the formation of the Islamic Republic and the Iranian Hostage Crisis in November 1979. The second article will begin with examining the impact of the Iran-Iraq War and trace historical events all the way up to the current political impasse that is still unfolding. It is my hope that by examining US-Iranian relations from an Iranian perspective, it will provide a more nuanced understanding of the nation’s history, politics, and help provide context for why the US and Iran have not been able to repair its relations since the Islamic Revolution. 

Before the reign of the Pahlavi Dynasty, which would rule Iran from 1925-1979, a series of successive monarchies had ruled Persia. It was under the reign of Emperor Safavid I in 1501, however, that Twelver Shi’ism, the largest branch of Shi'a Islam, was established ¹² as the official state religion. This foundation remains in place today. Although constituting a distinct nation, Persia has historically struggled to assert its territorial integrity and independence in the age of European colonialism. Interference from foreign powers and instability within weakened the Persian nation, leaving it susceptible to exploitation and weak governance. Solving the problems of building a strong state which could both enforce its own laws and protect its borders, while securing itself from malign foreign influences, became the principal objectives of the Persian nation.

In the early twentieth century, Persia began embarking on missions to accomplish these objectives. As a result of widespread contempt for the Qajar monarchy, a coalition of merchants, clergy and intellectuals banded together to cajole the government to adopt a new constitution ¹³ in 1906. Successful in this endeavor, a new Constitution was created. Despite institutionalizing progressive reforms such putting limits on royal authority and establishing a representative parliament (Majlis), the movement that led to its creation could not endure in the face of intense foreign intervention and deep internal divisions among the communities who had helped bring it into fruition. Prominent Iranian author and philosopher, Dariush Shayegan commented, for example, that “the constitution was very good, but it was akin to buying furniture without having a house” ¹⁴. Without the ability to build a strong state, secure its borders, and protect its sovereignty, Persia was at the mercy of Great Powers. 

Only a year after the Constitution was signed, Britain and Russia reached an agreement ¹⁵, dividing Persia into three spheres of influence, a northern Russian zone, a southern British zone, and a central zone that would act as a buffer. Officially, the agreement recognized Iran’s sovereignty and independence, but its main intent was to secure imperial interests and prevent further expansion of German influence in the region. Turned into a chess piece on the board of Great Power politics, anti-British and anti-Russian sentiment rose within Persia, fueling nationalist rhetoric and the desire for complete autonomy. These ideas remain the guiding principles that Iran follows today. 

Despite the recent foreign interventions, WWI presented a unique opportunity for the establishment of a truly independent Persian state. After the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, Russia became embroiled in their internal affairs.  Furthermore, the new Soviet government repudiated Tsarist Russia’s imperial claims and in 1918 they announced the annulment of the Anglo-Russian agreement ¹⁶. Shortly thereafter, Russia withdrew troops from Persia ¹⁷.

With the Russian presence in Persia diminished, Britain sought to capitalize. Signed on August 9, 1919, the Anglo-Persian Agreement ¹⁸ sought to effectively make Persia a protectorate of Britain, who would establish control over Persia’s military and foreign affairs. Causing outrage among Iranians, the agreement was not ratified by the Persian parliament (Majlis) and in 1921, it was abrogated when Reza Khan Pahlavi, a military officer, successfully launched a coup and deposed the Qajar monarchy ¹⁹. Four years later, he would assume a new title, Reza Shah Pahlavi, and rule Iran during the interwar period. 

Not mentioned up until this point is the American relationship with Iran, which in this period was  minor. Notably, however, it was relatively positive. American missionaries, for instance, established hospitals and schools around the country, which helped expand female education ²⁰. One American teacher in particular, Howard C. Baskerville ²¹, originally arriving in Iran under a two-year contract to teach at a missionary school, would later enlist in the ranks of the Constitutional Movement, where he gave up his life. At a bilateral level, America’s most significant role in Iran was  sending lawyer William Morgan Shuster to Persia, after the latter asked US President, William Howard Taft, for assistance in reorganizing its financial system. While there, Shuster would repeatedly clash with British and Russian officials, until he was forced to leave in 1912 ²². At this point, US-Iranian relations were promising, and unlike Britain and Russia, were not tainted with an imperialist label. 

Despite the establishment of a new government which oversaw a state-building process, Iran found itself in a perilous situation at the onset of World War II. Their main goals remained to retain their sovereignty and independence, yet the threat of becoming a staging ground for the great powers of the war loomed on the horizon. Britain and the Soviet Union had previously divvied up Iran between them and their original motives remained fundamentally unchanged. Adding to this dimension was Reza Pahlavi’s relatively positive relationship with Hitler’s Germany ²³. Building strong economic, cultural, and political ties, Germany, by 1941, accounted for nearly half (42%) of Iran’s imports ²⁴ and aired  “Radio Zeesen”, a radio program designed to promote Nazi propaganda, in Persian. In Iran specifically, the program focused on promoting anti-British propaganda ²⁵. Pahlavi, believing Germany was too committed to its race-based ideology, however, understood that none of the great powers, including Germany, had Iran’s best interests at heart ²⁶. At the onset of the German invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939, Iran declared neutrality, hoping to stay out of the war. 

Unfortunately this stance did not protect Iran. After the launch of Operation Barbarossa – the German invasion of the Soviet Union – Prime Minister Churchill in a country-wide address given the day after the attack offered the Soviet Union any technological or economic assistance within their power that could prove useful in fighting Germany ²⁷. Iran’s role in this objective was to serve as a link allowing Britain to send war materials to the Soviet Union ²⁸. On August 25, 1941, therefore, Britain and the Soviet troops invaded Iran, a plan in which the Soviets occupied roughly the northern half of the country and the British the southern half ²⁹. Following the invasion, Britain and Russia engineered the Shah’s abdication ³⁰ and his throne was replaced by his son, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi ³¹, who became the new Shah of Iran. Taking control of Iran, the allies – the US, UK, and the Soviet Union – met in Tehran in 1943 and issued the Tehran Declaration ³², confirming that Iran’s independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity would be respected after war’s end. 

US-Iranian relations shifted after August 1941 as American forces later joined their British and Soviet counterparts in Iran. Between 1942-1945, the US engaged with Iran in a much more active and multifaceted way than ever before. American advisers served Iranian governmental functions, such as managing its taxes, customs, and price controls, while also providing civilian and military supplies under the Lend-Lease Act, intended to help maintain internal security ³³. It was in this period that the US established a significant foothold inside Iran, whose presence would only expand after the end of the WWII and the beginning of the Cold War.

Following the end of World War II, Iran was in a state of flux. Despite the Allies agreeing to withdraw from Iran and recognize its sovereignty and independence in accordance with the Tehran Declaration, only American and British forces left immediately. Soviet forces stayed and  Stalin declared that securing oil concessions from Iran was a key factor in his decision to do so. He also sought to establish a strategic buffer zone and spread communist influence in the region. This action triggered the 1946 Iran Crisis, which was the first major crisis of the Cold War. 

At this point, Iran, Britain, and the US were all wary of growing Soviet influence. For the Shah, the 1946 crisis reinforced his belief that the old Russian imperialism of the late 19th and early 20th centuries had become more potent in a communist form and threatened the sovereignty of Iran ³⁴. In his famous speech in Missouri on March 5, 1947, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill warned that an Iron Curtain had spread across Europe, threatening the way of life of the democratic nations of the West ³⁵. In the US, President Truman released his Truman Doctrine, sounding the alarm on the malign influence of the Soviet Union and the need for countries like Iran to ally with the West ³⁶. The Shah, feeling vulnerable, was more than happy to ally with the US and US-Iranian relations, as a result, deepened. Anti-western forces in Iran, however, made forging a relationship with the US particularly difficult. In 1953, this internal conflict would eventually erupt with the US-British led Coup of Iranian President Mohammed Mossadegh. To understand what led to the coup, however, some context is needed. 

In 1901, Iran and Britain agreed to the D’Arcy Concession, an agreement between Mozaffar al-Din Shah of Persia and British entrepreneur William Knox D’Arcy. The agreement granted D’Arcy exclusive rights to explore, extract, and sell oil across most of Iran for 60 years. Iran, in return, would receive 16% of the future net profits from oil revenues ³⁷. The agreement led to the discovery of oil in Iran in 1908 and the creation of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (APOC) which would eventually become British Petroleum (BP) ³⁸. In 1935, the company’s name would change to the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) after Persia’s name change. 

The D’arcy Concession would prove to be a key point of disagreement between Britain and Iran.

Amid popular dissatisfaction with the lopsided terms of the agreement, Reza Shah cancelled the concession in 1932 ³⁹. This action brought the two sides to the negotiating table the following year, where they agreed upon terms for a new contract that would last until 1961 ⁴⁰. 

The agreement, however, would never reach its conclusion. Although the agreement established new terms for Iran, Iranian politicians called it a sell-out of Iran's national interests ⁴¹. During the next fourteen years, the debate over access to Iran’s oil continued to build until it finally reached a boiling point. In October 1949, Mohammed Mossadegh, a critic of the Pahlavi-dynasty, who insisted that Iran should seize control of its oil , founded the National Front, a new political party which quickly gained a majority in the Iranian parliament (Majlis) ⁴². On March 15, 1951, the Majlis passed legislation to nationalize the AIOC ⁴³, and after the assassination of pro-British prime minister, Ali Razmara, on March 7, the Majlis also elected Mossadegh as his replacement ⁴⁴. With the support of parliament and of the Iranian population at-large, Reza Shah was compelled to appoint Mossadegh as prime minister on April 29, 1951.

With the appointment of Mossadegh as prime minister, Iran’s relationship with Britain and the US hit a particularly tenuous phase. By nationalizing the AIOC, Iran put itself at odds with Britain, setting up a potential crisis in the gulf region. The US, meanwhile, wanting to avoid a crisis and seeking to ameliorate the rising tensions between Britain and Iran attempted to manage the situation. Initially, the US was sympathetic to Iran’s grievances, but soon grew cold toward Mossadegh, who was intransigent in his hardline stance toward Britain ⁴⁵. Unable to convince Mossadegh to compromise with Britain and also hearing rumors that Iran may collapse, ⁴⁶ Washington opted to sign on with Britain in their attempt to overthrow Mossadegh. Soon after, plans were developed to launch a coup d’etat against Mossadegh, led by the American CIA and British MI6. 

On August 19, 1953, Mossadegh was officially overthrown and power was reinstated to the Shah. This event marked a key turning point in US-Iranian relations, and had two main effects. First, it cemented Iran in the US camp of the Cold War. The Shah’s enhanced position was as a result of US intervention and his hostility toward the Soviet Union drew kept him on friendly terms with the US. In the following years, the US would invest heavily in the Iranian economy and security forces to help the Shah stay in power ⁴⁷. Second, it damaged the US’s reputation within Iran, who now were being ascribed with the imperialist label that had previously been associated with Britain and Russia ⁴⁸. 

The Mossadegh Coup was proof in the eyes of many Iranians that the United States was no different than imperial countries of the past that had undermined their sovereignty to promote their narrow self interests at the expense of the Iranian people. As the Shah became increasingly more despotic, these feelings of resentment would grow and eventually erupt in 1979. Events of that year, and the years immediately following, became embedded with Americans' perceptions of Iran. Context from within Iran sheds light on and provides a different perspective on the Iranian Revolution and the Hostage Crisis. It can be summed up in the story of the rise and fall of the Shah that follows.

During the twenty-five years preceding the Iranian Revolution the United States would instead play the role of Iran’s benefactor. Access to Iran’s oil and the security of the Persian Gulf grew in importance to US interests who provided economic and military aid in an effort to strengthen the Shah’s regime. Relations were so positive that on March 5, 1957, the US signed the Cooperation Concerning Civil Uses of Atoms with Iran, an agreement which gave it access to nuclear education and technology  ⁴⁹. Although only intended for peaceful, civilian uses, this decision lay the groundwork for Iran’s nuclear program, an issue which would rise to the forefront of US-Iranian relations decades later ⁵⁰.

Throughout the 1960s-1970s, Iran’s importance to the US would continue to grow. With the creation of the Organization for Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1960, of which Iran was a founding member, Iran saw its revenues increase and its control over oil production greatly increased ⁵¹. 

The formation of OPEC was shortly followed by the White Revolution of 1963, an ambitious program within Iran which sought to embrace social and economic reforms ⁵². Among giving women the right to vote and promoting land reform, the program also contributed to significant industrialization and economic growth. Between 1963-1977, Iran experienced its largest GDP growth in history ⁵³, signaling, in part, to the US that Iran could help uphold its security interests in the region. In President Richard Nixon’s state visit to Iran on May 30-31, 1972, he communicated this confidence, saying to the Shah, “protect me” ⁵⁴. Following the dictates of the Nixon Doctrine, where the US sought to offload defense responsibilities to some of its allies, it planned to make Iran the dominant, pro-Western defender of stability in the Persian Gulf. It appeared on the surface, therefore, that Iran was on pace to become the preeminent power in the region, but underneath the surface tensions were rising. 

The economic benefits of the White Revolution were significant but by no means universal. One of its most damaging effects was the massive inequality it exacerbated ⁵⁵ a factor which fueled growing opposition to the regime. This unrest was further inflamed by the SAVAK secret police, who according to Amnesty International exercised unlimited power, brutalized political opponents, and sometimes even harassed the Shah’s supporters  ⁵⁶. Making matters worse, in 1977-1978, economic mismanagement and inflation caused a severe economic contraction ⁵⁷. Thus, compounding economic pressures, the Shah’s increasingly authoritarian rule and top-down modernization measures created a pressure cooker ready to burst. 

The continued perception that the Shah was illegitimate and a puppet of the US was another factor that pointed to revolution. In the years following the 1953 Coup, the misguided measures, such as in 1975 to form Iran into a one-party state and ban all other political parties  ⁵⁸reinforced this perception. 

Negative views towards the Shah were represented across the political spectrum, including in intellectual circles and the general populace, but also among leftists and secular liberals and Islamists ⁵⁹. Out of all these constituencies, the most potent one proved to be the Islamists, who were represented by a leading figure, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Operating in exile in Najaf, Iraq from 1965-1978, Khomeini preached against the Shah, accusing him of corruption and subservience to the United States ⁶⁰. He organized a broad coalition against the Shah, smuggling tape-recorded speeches and pamphlets. In total, around 90,000 mosques duplicated and distributed them ⁶¹. As Iranians from all walks of life and backgrounds began demanding for the overthrow of the Shah’s regime, a catastrophic episode in US-Iranian relations was about to hit play.

By October 1978, Ruhollah Khomeini had moved to Paris, France, where he met with Karim Sanjabi, the leader of the National Front, the political party led by Mossadegh before the 1953 coup ⁶². In this meeting, an alliance was formed between the secular liberal forces of Sanjabi and the religious opposition led by Khomeini, as they united in opposition against the Shah. By this point, grievances with Western influence had reached a boiling point. With the installation of Reza Khan in 1925 by Britain and the backing of his son, Mohammed Reza Shah in 1953 by the US in the back of their minds, Sanjabi and Khomeini issued a joint statement calling for the end of the Shah’s rule and proposing a new government based on Islamic principles. 

Inside Iran, unrest was growing. Starting in 1978, a series of crackdowns by the Shah’s regime enhanced mobilization of the Iranian population. At the Qom Protests on January 7, organized by Iranian theology students who were protesting against a state-sponsored newspaper attacking Khomeini, several demonstrators were killed ⁶³. From February-May, Shi’a mourning rituals generated recurring protests in cities such as Tabriz and Yazd, each of which were met with crackdowns by the regime ⁶⁴. On August 19, hundreds died in the Cinema Rex Fire in Abadan, an event widely blamed on the Shah's regime ⁶⁵. A few weeks later on September 8, Iranian state troops fired on demonstrators in Tehran’s Jaleh Square, an event where martial law was imposed and later became known as “Black Friday” ⁶⁶. Increasing unrest throughout the rest of 1978 culminated in the Muharram Protests, a nationwide demonstration which illustrating that the Shah’s regime was in its final stand ⁶⁷. Facing this mounting pressure against his rule, the Shah left Iran for the final time on January 16, 1979, seeking refuge in Egypt, where he would die a year later in 1980. On February 1, 1979, Khomeini, after spending 15 years in exile, finally returned to Iran, meeting massive crowds in Tehran. 

In his first speech from exile, Khomeini denounced the Shah’s regime, calling it a corrupt, US- backed dictatorship. He promised to strike back against the “satanic” US regime emphasizing that the revolution’s victory depended on maintaining adherence to Islamic, rather than Western or Eastern principles ⁶⁸. Triggering massive, celebratory crowds throughout the country, loyalist troops who initially attempted to oppose pro-Khomeini forces were forced to declare neutrality on February 11, the date which officially marked the end of the Shah’s regime ⁶⁹. After a brief transitional government, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the official name of Iran today, was announced on April 1, 1979. Ayatollah Khomeini became the republic’s first Supreme Leader. 

These drastic series of events were crushing for the United States' strategic goals in the region. Since the British withdrawal from the Persian Gulf in 1971, Iran had become the cornerstone of protecting American interests in the region. With the renewed faith the Nixon administration placed on Iran in 1972, it was expected that Iran would continue to grow as a pro-Western, American ally in the region and as a central bulwark in containing the expansion of the Soviet Union. 

In 1979, the situation had completely flipped on its head. Now, the United States found itself at odds with an intransigent foe, who had denounced American intervention in Iranian affairs. The US would be forced to chart a new course in its relationship with Iran as it continued to try to achieve its regional and global interests. This was the dynamic present, when in November 1979, Iranians stormed the US embassy in Tehran, taking hostage American diplomats, triggering a political crisis. 

Although the world remembers November 4, 1979, as the day US-Iranian relations ruptured, the US had actually tried to shift the events of the Iranian Revolution in their favor by working with moderate forces within Iran. When the Islamic Republic was declared in April, the Islamist wing of the revolution had not yet seized complete political control over the Iranian state ⁷⁰. The moderate forces represented the pro-democracy wing of the revolution, and were headed by Mehdi Bazargan, the Prime Minister during the brief interregnum period between the arrival of Khomeini and the declaration of the Islamic Republic. This camp, and specifically Barzagan, emerged as a political rival of Khomeini in 1979. They were committed to Islam as a foundational principle, however its version promoted Islam as a modernizing force, rather than Khomeini’s more conservative and fundamentalist version ⁷¹. The US, seeing Bazargan as a potential solution to the crisis in Iran, decided to meet with US President Jimmy Carter’s national security advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, on November 1, 1979, where the two attempted to hash out an agreement to reform US-Iranian relations ⁷². When news of the meeting broke out, however, Barzagan was condemned ⁷³, and once the events of the Hostage Crisis unfolded, the US was no longer willing to reform relations . 

With the abduction of fifty-two of its diplomats in Iran, the US attempted to respond quickly to secure their release. The US initially pursued diplomatic channels to secure the release of the hostages, including sending an envoy to meet with Ayatollah Khomeini. On November 14, 1979, President Carter signed Executive Order 12170, freezing Iranian government assets held by US banks and initiating its first wave of economic sanctions, including a ban on the importation of Iranian oil ⁷⁴. The US also worked through the UN Security Council to secure Resolution 457, calling on Iran to release the hostages ⁷⁵. Showing some apparent success, Iran released 13 hostages, mostly women and African Americans on November 19-20 ⁷⁶ . President Carter, however, was unable to secure the release of the other hostages and the crisis dragged on into 1980. 

During 1980, the Carter administration attempted to secure the release of the hostages through diplomatic, economic, and military means. Its most daring attempt was “Operation Eagle Claw”, conducted on April 24. It was a complex military rescue plan, involving highly trained Delta Force tasked with flying into Tehran to secure the hostages, and fly them out. The operation failed miserably, however, resulting in a fatal helicopter-plane collision, killing eight US service members and forcing a return to negotiations ⁷⁷. This event occurred after a new low in relations, when the US and Iran formally severed diplomatic ties on April 7 ⁷⁸. Throughout the rest of the year, the US worked diplomatically with Iran to secure the hostages’ release, a breakthrough of which occurred on January 21, 1981, when the two nations agreed to the Algiers Accords, negotiations which were mediated by Algeria ⁷⁹. As part of the Accords, the fifty-two hostages were released in exchange for the unfreezing of Iranian assets, the promising of US non-intervention in Iranian affairs, and the establishing of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal in the Hague to resolve commercial disputes. The agreement officially marked the end of this profound diplomatic episode between the US and Iran and set the stage for their hostile relations going into the future.

From its days as Persia to its formation as an Islamic Republic, the nation of Iran  experienced multiple upheavals. Facing imperial pressure from Britain and the Soviet Union during both world wars, Iran was unable to overcome foreign intervention, and found its nation subjugated. Following the end of World War II, Iran entered a new phase in its history, but also found itself embroiled in Cold War dynamics. Attempting to reassert its independence and sovereignty, it sought to nationalize its oil industry under the leadership of Mohammed Mossadegh, only to find itself subjugated again by a Western power, this time in the form of the US. For twenty-five years, the Shah ruled Iran as an autocrat, expanding his power, while also attempting to modernize and strengthen the country. During this period, anti-government sentiment festered and grew into a broad-based popular front, which ultimately saw the end of  his regime and exile, and the establishment of the Islamic Republic. 

US-Iranian relations, naturally, reflect the major historical events of Iran’s history. Before the Cold War began, the US and Iran initially had relatively positive relations. With the establishment of missions, schools, hospitals, and financial assistance approved by President Taft, Americans supported Persian interests despite the imposing British and Russian presence in the nation, moves which saw some killed or evicted. In World War II, the US’s primary interest in Iran was to aid the allied war effort, but in the process, it helped manage the internal affairs of the country. At the onset of the Cold War, US influence and interest in Iran grew, eventually leading to its decision to overthrow Mossadegh and empower the Shah, turning him into an autocrat. This decision situated Iran within the American camp during the Cold War, but it also attached the imperialist label onto the US, which for as long as it supported the Shah, it could not shake off. After twenty-five years of growing despotic rule, the Iranian people overthrew the Shah and in its place established the Islamic Republic, a new government hostile to the US. After the Iranian Hostage Crisis, the US-Iranian relationship reached a new low. The two nations severed diplomatic relations and to this day they have not been able to repair them. 

This new dynamic was the reality the US and Iran found themselves in 1981. The next article will explore Iranian history from 1981 to the present day, discussing the new outbreak of war between the US and Israel against Iran. I will start, however, with a conflict that began in the middle of the Hostage Crisis in September 1980, and which had a profound impact on Iran, the Middle East, and US-Iranian relations, the Iran-Iraq War. 

¹ BBC News, “Title of Video,” BBC, broadcast Month Day, Year, video, mm:ss, https://www.bbc.com/news/videos/cqxdy0xqrr8o. 

² Al Jazeera. “Iran Death Toll Reaches 555 as US, Israel Escalate Attacks.” Al Jazeera, March 2, 2026. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/3/2/iran-death-toll-reaches-555-as-us-israel-escalate-attacks. 

³ Shankar, Priyanka. “Who Are Iran’s Senior Figures Killed in US-Israeli Attacks?” Al Jazeera, March 1, 2026. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/3/1/who-are-irans-senior-figures-killed-in-us-israeli-attacks.  

⁴ BBC News, “What Is Happening in Iran? What We Know about US-Israel Attack and Tehran Response,” BBC News, March 1, 2026, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cx2dyz6p3weo.

⁵ The Guardian, “Gulf States on Verge of Acting Against Iran over ‘Reckless’ Strikes across Region,” The Guardian, March 2, 2026, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/mar/02/gulf-states-iran-strikes-response.

⁶ Palace, Joint Statement by the Leaders of France, Germany and the United Kingdom on Indiscriminate Iranian Attacks on Countries in the Region, March 1, 2026, https://www.elysee.fr/en/emmanuel-macron/2026/03/01/joint-statement-by-the-leaders-of-france-germany-and-the-united-kingdom-on-indiscriminate-iranian-attacks-on-countries-in-the-region.

⁷ BBC News, “UK Will Allow US to Use Bases to Strike Iranian Missile Sites, PM Says,” BBC News, March 2, 2026, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cqj9g11p1ezo.

⁸ Callum Sutherland, “British Base Hit in Cyprus, U.K. Terror Threat Under Review as Iran War Spreads,” TIME, March 2, 2026, https://time.com/7382076/british-base-hit-iran-war-drones-united-kingdom-terror-threat/.

⁹ Jon Gambrell, Melanie Lidman, Josh Boak, and Eric Tucker, “U.S. and Israel Pound Targets across Iran as Trump Signals Openness to Talk to New Leadership,” PBS NewsHour, March 1, 2026, https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/u-s-and-israel-pound-targets-across-iran-as-trump-signals-openness-to-talk-to-new-leadership.

¹⁰ “Iran Vows Defense Amid Strikes,” The Hill, March 1, 2026, https://thehill.com/policy/international/5761881-iran-vows-defense-amid-strikes/.

¹¹ U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, “Iran — A Guide to the United States’ History of Recognition, Diplomatic, and Consular Relations, by Country, since 1776” (Washington, DC), accessed March 2, 2026, https://history.state.gov/countries/iran.

¹² Ballandalus, “The Conversion of Iran to Twelver Shi’ism: A Preliminary Historical Overview,” Ballandalus (blog), August 4, 2014, https://ballandalus.wordpress.com/2014/08/04/the‑conversion‑of‑iran‑to‑twelver‑shiism‑a‑preliminary‑historical‑overview/. 

¹³ The Fundamental Laws (Constitution) of December 30, 1906 (English translation), Iran Data Portal, Syracuse University, accessed February 26, 2026. https://irandataportal.syr.edu/wp‑content/uploads/iran1906.pdf. 

¹⁴ Dariush Shayegan, “Why Didn’t We Have a Raymond Aaron? Report of an Interview with Daryush Shayegan, quoted in Vali Nasr, Iran’s Grand Strategy: A Political History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2025), 15.

¹⁵ Firuz Kazemzadeh, “Anglo‑Russian Convention of 1907: An Agreement Relating to Persia, Afghanistan, and Tibet,” Encyclopaedia Iranica, accessed February 26, 2026, https://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/anglo‑russian‑convention‑of‑1907‑an‑agreement‑relating‑to‑persia‑afghanistan‑and‑tibet/.

¹⁶ Reisman, W. Michael. 1980. “Termination of the USSR’s Treaty Right of Intervention in Iran.” American Journal of International Law 74, no. 1: 144–154. https://doi.org/10.2307/2200909.

¹⁷ Misagh Parsa, “Iran from 1919,” in The New Cambridge History of Islam, ed. Francis Robinson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 481, https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521838269.019.

¹⁸ Fatemi, Nasrollah S. “Anglo-Persian Agreement of 1919.” Encyclopaedia Iranica 2, no. 1 (1985): 59–61. https://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/anglo-persian-agreement-1919/. 

¹⁹ Niloofar Shambayati, “Coup d’État of 1299/1921,” Encyclopaedia Iranica (Vol. VI, Fasc. 4, 1993), 351–54, https://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/coup-detat-of-1299-1921/.

²⁰ Armajani, Yahya. “Alborz College.” Encyclopædia Iranica. Accessed February 26, 2026. https://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/alborz-college/. 

²¹ “Baskerville, Howard C.” Encyclopædia Iranica. Accessed February 26, 2026. https://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/baskerville-howard-c/. 

²² W. Morgan Shuster, The Strangling of Persia: A Story of the European Diplomacy and Oriental Intrigue That Resulted in the Denationalization of Twelve Million Mohammedans (New York: The Century Co., 1912), accessed February 26, 2026 https://www.loc.gov/item/12016068/ 

²³ The Shah, the Nazis, and the Invasion: Impact of World War II on Iran, The Lion and The Sun, published ~8 months ago, accessed February 24, 2026, https://thelionandthesun.org/1126/the-shah-the-nazis-and-the-invasion-impact-of-world-war-ii-on-iran/.

²⁴ United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, “Iran During World War II,” Holocaust Encyclopedia, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, accessed February 24, 2026, https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/iran-during-world-war-ii.

²⁵ The 1948 War and the Iranian and Arab Nazi Propaganda, Israel Academia Monitor, published July 16, 2023, accessed February 24, 2026, https://israel-academia-monitor.com/2023/07/16/the-1948-war-and-the-iranian-and-arab-nazi-propaganda/.

²⁶ United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, “Iran During World War II.” 

²⁷ Winston S. Churchill, “The Fourth Climacteric,” America’s National Churchill Museum, accessed February 24, 2026, https://www.nationalchurchillmuseum.org/the-fourth-climacteric.html.

²⁸ Federal Research Division, Iran: A Country Study, chap. 16, Politics (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 2008), https://countrystudies.us/iran/16.htm. 

²⁹  “Anglo‑Soviet invasion of Iran,” Saylor Academy PDF, accessed via Anglo‑Soviet invasion of Iraq (https://resources.saylor.org …, PDF), 1–2.

³⁰ Shaul Bakhash, “Britain and the Abdication of Reza Shah,” Iranian Studies Program, Stanford University, February 25, 2021, accessed February 24, 2026, https://iranian‑studies.stanford.edu/events/lecture‑series/britain‑and‑abdication‑reza‑shah. 

³¹ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E‑4: Documents on Iran and Iraq, 1969–1972, Document 180, U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, accessed February 24, 2026, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969‑76ve04/d180. 

³²  U.S. Department of State,“The Tehran Conference, 1943,” Milestones in the History of U.S. Foreign Relations, accessed February 24, 2026, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1937‑1945/tehran‑conf. 

³³ Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1945, The Near East and Africa, Volume VIII, Document 360, memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) to the Secretary of State, August 23, 1945, U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, accessed February 24, 2026, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945v08/d360  

³⁴  Kyle Orton, “The Shah, the Cold War, and the Islamists, ” Kyle Orton’s Blog, March 20, 2019, https://kyleorton.co.uk/2019/03/20/the-shah-the-cold-war-and-the-islamists/.

³⁵ Winston Churchill, “The Sinews of Peace (’Iron Curtain Speech’),” International Churchill Society, accessed March 2, 2026, https://winstonchurchill.org/resources/speeches/1946-1963-elder-statesman/the-sinews-of-peace/. 

³⁶ “The Truman Doctrine, 1947, ” U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, accessed March 2, 2026, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/truman-doctrine. 

³⁷ U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1920, Volume III, Document 401, in Persia (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State,” May 18, 1920, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1920v03/d401. 

³⁸ Al Hart,“BP – A Long, Bloody History of Reckless Greed,” UE Union (blog), June 24, 2010, https://www.ueunion.org/ue-news-feature/2010/bp-a-long-bloody-history-of-reckless-greed. 

³⁹ A. C. Millspaugh, “The Persian-British Oil Dispute,” Foreign Affairs 11, no. 3 (1933): 521–25, https://doi.org/10.2307/20030533. 

⁴⁰ Parviz Mina, “OIL AGREEMENTS IN IRAN,” Encyclopædia Iranica, July 20, 2004, last modified November 8, 2012, https://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/oil-agreements-in-iran/. 

⁴¹ Mina, OIL AGREEMENTS IN IRAN

⁴² Iran Chamber Society, “Frenemies: Iran and America since 1900,” accessed March 2, 2026, https://www.iranchamber.com/history/articles/frenemies_iran_america_since_1900.php. 

⁴³ Byron Cannon, “Iran Nationalizes Its Oil Industry,” EBSCO Research Starters: History (2023), accessed March 2, 2026, https://www.ebsco.com/research-starters/history/iran-nationalizes-its-oil-industry, which discusses the March 1951 nationalization of the Anglo‑Iranian Oil Company by the Iranian Majlis.

⁴⁴ “Mohammad Mosaddegh,” Encyclopædia Britannica, last updated March 1, 2026, accessed March 2, 2026, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Mohammad-Mosaddegh, noting that after the Majlis passed the oilnationalization act in March 1951, Mosaddegh’s power had “grown so great that the shah … was virtually forced to appoint him premier.”

⁴⁵ George L. Simpson Jr.,“Revisiting the U.S. Role in Three Middle East Crises,” Middle East Quarterly 25, no. 3 (Summer 2018), accessed March 2, 2026, https://www.meforum.org/middle-east-quarterly/revisiting-the-us-role-in-three-middle-east-crises, noting that “Washington showed sympathy for Iranian nationalism” after oil nationalization in 1951 but shifted away from accommodation as Mossadegh’s hardline stance persisted.

⁴⁶ Gregory Brew, “The Collapse Narrative: The United States, Mohammed Mossadegh, and the Coup Decision of 1953,” Texas National Security Review 2, no. 4 (November 6, 2019), accessed March 2, 2026, https://tnsr.org/2019/11/the-collapse-narrative-the-united-states-mohammed-mossadegh-and-the-coup-decision-of-1953 

⁴⁷ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXII: Iran, summary, U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, accessed March 2, 2026, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v22/summary, noting that U.S. policymakers regarded Iran as “one of the most dependable U.S. allies in the region” and continued to support Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi as a strategic Cold War partner.

⁴⁸ Shaul Bakhash, “The U.S. and Iran in Historical Perspective,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, September 28, 2009, accessed March 2, 2026, https://www.fpri.org/article/2009/09/the-u-s-and-iran-in-historical-perspective/ 

⁴⁹ U.S. Relations With Iran, timeline, Council on Foreign Relations, updated February 28, 2026, accessed March 2, 2026, https://www.cfr.org/timelines/us-relations-iran 

⁵⁰ Katherine Malus, “From ‘Atoms for Peace’ to ‘JCPOA’: History of Iranian Nuclear Development,” K=1 Project, Columbia University, September 9, 2018, accessed March 2, 2026, https://k1project.columbia.edu/content/atoms-peace-jcpoa-history-iranian-nuclear-development 

⁵¹ Kamiar Mohaddes and M. Hashem Pesaran, “One Hundred Years of Oil Income and the Iranian Economy: A Curse or a Blessing?” ERF Working Paper No. 771 (The Economic Research Forum, 2014), 2, https://erf.org.eg/app/uploads/2014/07/771.pdf.

⁵² “White Revolution” Encyclopædia Britannica, accessed March 2, 2026, https://www.britannica.com/topic/White-Revolution 

⁵³ Hashem M. Pesaran, “ECONOMY ix. IN THE P AHLAVI PERIOD,” Encyclopædia Iranica, last updated January 16, 2014, accessed March 2, 2026, https://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/economy-ix-in‑the‑pahlavi‑period 

⁵⁴ Roham Alvandi, “Nixon, Kissinger, and the Shah: The Origins of Iranian Primacy in the Persian Gulf,” Diplomatic History 36, no. 2 (April 2012): 338, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467‑7709.2011.01025.x 

⁵⁵ Shantanu Choukikar, “Iran’s White Revolution: A Reformation Attempt That Eventually Backfired Catastrophically,” Medium, June 16, 2025, accessed March 2, 2026, https://medium.com/@shawnchoukikar/irans-white-revolution‑8f165d9a687d 

⁵⁶ IRB – Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Information on SAVAK [IRN7544], Document #1182349, January 4, 1991, ecoi.net, 1–2, https://www.ecoi.net/de/dokument/1182349.html 

⁵⁷ Andrew Scott Cooper,“Comment | Iran’s Economy: Once More to the Precipice,” PBS Frontline / Tehran Bureau, May 16, 2012, accessed March 2, 2026, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2012/05/comment‑irans‑economy‑once‑more‑to‑the‑precipice.html 

⁵⁸  “Shah Decrees Iran a One‑Party Nation,” New York Times, March 3, 1975, accessed March 2, 2026, https://www.nytimes.com/1975/03/03/archives/shah-decrees-iran-a-oneparty-nation.html

⁵⁹ “Iranians Overthrow the Shah, 1977–79,” Global Nonviolent Action Database (Swarthmore College), accessed March 2, 2026, https://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/iranians-overthrow-shah-1977-79 

⁶⁰ Sermons and Speeches by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, UNC Greensboro Islamic World Readings (from excerpts translated and edited by Hamid Algar), accessed March 2, 2026, https://home.uncg.edu/~jwjones/islamicworld/readings/khomeini.html 

⁶¹ “The Tapes That Sparked the Iranian Revolution,” On the Media, WNYC Studios, November 26, 2021, accessed March 2, 2026, https://www.wnycstudios.org/podcasts/otm/segments/tapes‑sparked‑iranian‑revolution‑on‑the‑media 

⁶² “Opponent Bars a Coalition Under Shah; Compromise in Crisis Doubted,” New York Times, December 8, 1978, sec. accessed March 2, 2026, https://www.nytimes.com/1978/12/08/archives/opponent-bars-a-coalition-under-shah-compromise-in-crisis-doubted.html. 

⁶³ “1978 Qom Protest,” Wikipedia, last modified January 12, 2026, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1978_Qom_protest 

⁶⁴ Suzanne Maloney and Keian Razipour, “The Iranian revolution — A timeline of events,” Brookings Institution, January 24, 2019, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-iranian-revolution-a-timeline-of-events/. 

⁶⁵ “Cinema Rex fire,” Wikipedia, last modified February 20, 2026, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cinema_Rex_Fire 

⁶⁶ Santiago Montag,“Black Friday: The Massacre That Ignited a Revolution in Iran,” Left Voice,September 9, 2021, https://www.leftvoice.org/black-friday-the-massacre-that-ignited-a-revolution-in-iran/. 

⁶⁷ Opposition Demonstrations in Iran: Leadership, Organization, and Tactics, CIA Intelligence Memorandum (December 21, 1978), CIA‑RDP80T00634A000500010038‑0, Central Intelligence Agency, accessed March 2, 2026, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80T00634A000500010038-0.pdf. 

⁶⁸ Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, Address to the Nation, April 1, 1979, National Security Archive, Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 1842 GMT 1 Apr 79, translated by FBIS, accessed March 2, 2026, https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/28043-document-03-ayatollah-ruhollah-khomeini-address-nation-april-1-1979. 

⁶⁹ Nicholas Gage,“Army Withdraws Its Support for Bakhtiar; Iranian Prime Minister Reported to Resign, York Times, February 12, 1979, p. A1, accessed March 2, 2026, https://www.nytimes.com/1979/02/12/archives/army-withdraws-its-support-for-bakhtiar-iranian-prime-minister.html

⁷⁰ Haleh Esfandiari, review of Democracy in Iran: Why It Failed and How It Might Succeed, Foreign Affairs 97, no. 1 (January/February 2018): 143–149, accessed March 2, 2026, https://www.jstor.org/stable/44822022.

⁷¹ Riaz Hassan,“Iran’s Islamic Revolutionaries: Before and After the Revolution,” Third World Quarterly 6, no. 3 (July 1984): 675–686, accessed March 2, 2026, https://www.jstor.org/stable/3992069. 

⁷² Memorandum from Gary Sick to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski), November 5, 1979, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XI, Part 1: Iran: Hostage Crisis, November 1979–September 1980, Doc. 4, U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, accessed March 2, 2026, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v11p1/d4. 

⁷³ “History of Iran: Iran After the Victory of 1979’s Revolution,” Iran Chamber, accessed March 2, 2026, https://www.iranchamber.com/history/islamic_revolution/revolution_and_iran_after1979_4.php.  

⁷⁴ Executive Order No. 12170, Blocking Iranian Government Property, November 14, 1979, 44 F.R. 65729, U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control, accessed March 2, 2026, https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/6316/download?inline. 

⁷⁵ United Nations Security Council, Resolution 457 (1979), S/RES/457 (Dec. 4, 1979), United Nations DigitalLibrary, accessed March 2, 2026, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/5826?ln=en 

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⁷⁸ “Iran,” U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, accessed March 2, 2026, https://history.state.gov/countries/iran.

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